Prospects for Reform? The Collapse of
Community Policing in Chicago
Wesley G. Skogan†
In an era of renewed enthusiasm for police reform, it could be instructive to
examine how reforms—even successful reforms—fail. In the 1990s and 2000s,
Chicago’s community-policing initiative was widely recognized as one of the most
impressive in the country. In short order, it then collapsed. Community policing’s
accomplishments were numerous, but it fell victim to issues commonly facing reform: money—especially the impact of economic downturns; leadership turnover
and policy preferences; changes in the social, political, and crime environments; and
the emergence of new technologies for responding to community concerns.

I. PROSPECTS FOR REFORM? THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNITY
POLICING IN CHICAGO
Planning for Chicago’s community-policing program began in
earnest in early 1992. 1 Following a 1993–1994 developmental
period in five police districts, the project grew to encompass all
twenty-five of the city’s districts. 2 The Chicago Alternative Policing
Strategy (CAPS) created opportunities for police and residents to
build positive relationships with one another. 3 It quickly expanded
to encompass thousands of yearly local community meetings,
district-level advisory committees, block-by-block doorstop visits
by civilian community organizers, intensified delivery of city services to dilapidated areas, and widespread involvement of city
residents in neighborhood crime-prevention projects. 4 In a few
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years, CAPS grew to be the most impressive community-policing
effort in the country. By 2010, Chicagoans had attended their local
beat meeting on almost one million occasions, 5 and politicians ran
for office touting the fact they had been activists in the program.6
But by 2010, CAPS was unraveling. Community meetings
dried up, local commanders stopped consulting with what remained of their advisory committees, most community organizers
were laid off, and the police department no longer played a major
role in identifying areas with high service needs. 7 The project’s
budget had been slashed. After a successful fifteen-year run, most
of the police officers assigned to work on CAPS moved on, and it
lost its place in the city’s organization chart. 8 Community policing
was not dead in Chicago, but it was on life support.
In an era of renewed enthusiasm for police reform, it could be
instructive to review how reforms fail. Many fail because they
were never much more than a press release. Others struggle to find
a secure place in the organization after their founding believers
and political supporters move on (the police chief’s job is usually
a revolving door). Still more projects are hollowed out but kept
around so that mayors and chiefs have something to point to when
questioned. While other priorities come and go, aggressive enforcement always lurks in the wings, waiting for a call when crime
spikes. Police reform has enemies. Change may threaten career
and bureaucratic interests, upset working union-management
relations, and run afoul of some of the many touchstones of police
culture. Projects requiring the cooperation of other city agencies
can be complicated. 9
However, community policing in Chicago was more than a
press release. Foundations provided funding for special projects,
and think tanks promoted it as the future of policing. 10 The research arm of the U.S. Department of Justice published a summary
report on its progress and remaining challenges. 11 But CAPS still
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ran up against several of the obstacles that often scupper reform.
Even successful reforms can fail, and around the country, some
have failed. 12 What happened to community policing in Chicago?
Many of the observations and inferences reported in this paper
are based on research conducted in Chicago. My involvement began in mid-1992 and continued thereafter. What I concluded has
appeared in three books on community policing in Chicago and in
numerous research articles and government reports, some of
which are cited here. My question in this Essay is new, however.
It caused me to reflect on what has occurred during the ensuing
years. Sensing that there was a problem, our team conducted a
follow-up evaluation of CAPS between 2014 and 2015. This involved interviews; meeting observations; surveys of meeting participants; and analyses of crime, demographic, and beat-meetingparticipation data. The fieldwork focused on eight broadly representative police districts, where we interviewed key staff members,
attended beat and District Advisory Committee meetings, and
discussed trends with a range of community and CAPS activists.
This Essay incorporates the unpublished findings of this followup evaluation and my continuing monitoring of the program. It is
organized in ways that fit the Chicago case into the larger domain
of community policing and reform more generally. Its lessons provide a list of things to watch out for.
II. CAPS’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS
During its effective years, community policing provided a
venue for building trust and confidence in the police among a
large number of city residents. Chicago’s model called for officers
to listen to residents and to pay special attention to problems that
they identified as most important, giving residents a voice in how
their communities were policed. 13 Discussions of priority problems
took place in monthly community meetings—through District
Advisory Committees and their subcommittees—and in many
other venues. 14 CAPS also encouraged residents to participate actively in crime-prevention and crime-solving efforts. 15 Rather
than being treated as passive victims who encounter officers only
12 Wesley G. Skogan, What Happened to Community Policing?, Testimony for the
Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction of the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing 1–2 (Feb. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/CY2S-RRBM.
13 ON THE BEAT, supra note 4, at 53–54 (describing the heightened community role
in the CAPS problem-solving model).
14 Id. at 68–73.
15 SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 180.
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when something goes seriously wrong, residents were invited to
see themselves as valuable partners who had something to contribute to community safety. They were encouraged to meet and
work collaboratively with officers to address local issues. During
1998, police and civilian community organizers trained thousands
of city residents in how to decipher local problems and address
them through collective action. 16 Our follow-up survey of participants found that more than 60% got involved in addressing what
they identified as their community’s priority problems. 17 Police
had special access to city agencies that could bring resources to
bear on solving priority problems. These ranged from graffiticleanup teams to expedited towing of abandoned cars and calling
in city inspectors to investigate serious building code issues.18
Special programs for youth, seniors, and other groups allowed
police to make additional connections with harder-to-reach corners of the community. 19
By sheer numbers, beat community meetings were the city’s
most important mechanism for building and sustaining relationships between police and the public. 20 They created occasions for
police and residents to meet face-to-face and get acquainted,
something that residents prized. The meetings also provided a
forum for exchanging information and a venue for identifying and
prioritizing problems in an area. No one was sure how the public
would respond when the Chicago Police Department (CPD)
launched its first trial beat meetings in late 1993, but they turned
out to be a big success. The number of people who came into contact
with Chicago police under the auspices of CAPS was very large.
Between 1995 and the end of 2010, residents attended more than
45,100 of these meetings. 21 Apart from elections, it is difficult to
identify a municipal activity—of any kind and anywhere in the
country—that attracts similar levels of individual civic participation. The meetings were also highly visible. A city survey found
that more than 80% of Chicagoans knew about CAPS, and 60%
knew that meetings were being held in their neighborhood. 22 Regular surveys conducted for the evaluation found that support for

Id. at 103.
Id.
18 Id. at 193–94, 180–81.
19 Id. at 198–200.
20 SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 68 (finding that over half a million Chicagoans attended
beat meetings between 1995 and 2003).
21 Data on file with author.
22 SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 105, 119.
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the police grew with time.23 Confidence—particularly in perceptions
of their responsiveness to neighborhood priorities—grew among
Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics.24 During the 1990s, observers came from all over the policing world to see CAPS in action;
it was routine to run into officers from the Bundeskriminalamt
(Germany’s federal police force) or London’s Metropolitan Police
Service in the halls at police headquarters and in the back row at
community meetings. In May 2021, London police were still running beat meetings. 25
III. THE ENVIRONMENT CHANGED
But the nation and the city changed. Two of the most dramatic
events of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries—a
large and virtually nationwide decline in crime and the worst
economic downturn in eighty years—together undercut two fundamental underpinnings of Chicago’s community-policing effort.
A. Crime Declined
CAPS was launched during an extremely violent period. In
1992, Chicago saw the highest homicide rate in its history. The
943 killings that year were second to the 970 murders recorded in
1974, but the city’s population had dropped by 400,000 residents
in the interim. 26 Shootings, which included the victims of gun
violence who survived, peaked in 1991. 27 Robbery and serious
assaults were also near record highs. CAPS was a police-department
program, and crime was on people’s minds. During the mid-1990s,
both citywide surveys and questionnaires distributed at beat
meetings found that those who turned out for CAPS events were
primarily concerned about crime. Compared to the views of general samples of residents from their own areas, attendees at the
meetings were more worried about crime and disorder problems
than were their immediate neighbors. Beat-meeting participation
and problem-solving activism were highest in Chicago’s poorest
23 See TAKING STOCK, supra note 4, at 19 (describing increasing across-the-board improvements in police approval from 1993 to 2001).
24 SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 280.
25 See
City of London Police (@CityPolice), TWITTER (May 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/43A2-AHQQ.
26 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, CHICAGO MURDER ANALYSIS (2011), https://perma.cc/P3BV-D3W6;
William Recktenwald & Colin McMahon, Deadly End to Deadly Year, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 1,
1993), https://perma.cc/K6U4-EY4E.
27 See ON THE BEAT, supra note 4, at 203–04 (noting that higher rates of CAPS
activism were associated with neighborhoods with high levels of poverty whereas engagement was less common in White and more affluent areas).
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and most crime-ridden beats. Turnout was greatest in places
where other community institutions—including schools and the
health care system—were failing and where residents’ well-being
was most at risk on many fronts. However, violent crime was the
single strongest predictor of meeting attendance rates. 28
It is important to note that these were distinctive findings.
There has been a great deal of research on the community factors
that control crime. These include neighborhood associations and
volunteer groups, informal social control, solidarity between
neighbors, and a willingness to intervene to nip problems in the
bud. 29 But research—including important studies conducted in
Chicago—finds that the benefits of community involvement usually flow disproportionately to better-off homeowners and racial
majorities living in less-troubled communities that already get
along with the police. 30 Beat meetings looked quite different. They
successfully created opportunities for involvement in poorer,
more dilapidated, and crime-ridden areas that were plagued by
gang, drug, and social-disorder problems—where the general population did not like the police very much. 31
Then crime declined. Between the early 1990s and the late
2000s, shootings dropped by 70%, murders (a one-in-five subset
of shootings) by about 50%, and robbery by about 67%. 32 The drop
in crime in Chicago was both historic and unexpected. It was accompanied by a parallel decline in fear of crime, which dropped
by ten to twenty percentage points, depending on residents’
backgrounds. 33 Fear of crime among women went down by twenty
percentage points. By 1999, the city’s senior citizens were no more
fearful than younger adults, a reversal of established trends. 34 A
statistical analysis of ten-year trends in fear concluded that these
declines were primarily due to improving perceptions of neighborhood crime and disorder and the dramatic drop in recorded
crime. 35
SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 112–19.
See generally, e.g., Patrick Sharkey, Gerard Torrats-Espinosa & Delaram Takyar,
Community and the Crime Decline: The Causal Effect of Local Nonprofits on Violent Crime,
82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1214 (2017).
30 See Skogan, supra note 5, at 148.
31 See id. at 148–50.
32 WESLEY G. SKOGAN & LYNN STEINER, CHI. CMTY. POLICING EVALUATION
CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEAR TEN 74 (2004),
https://perma.cc/5EBG-7K5M.
33 Wesley G. Skogan, Trends in Crime and Fear: Lessons from Chicago, 1994–2003,
in EMOTIONS, CRIME AND JUSTICE 101, 104–05 (Suzanne Karstedt et al. eds., 2011).
34 Id. at 104.
35 SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 265–66.
28
29
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FIGURE 1: TRENDS IN MEETING ATTENDANCE AND CRIME

In tandem with trends in crime, community-meeting attendance dropped across the board. It was down the most in poor areas
where most of the decline in crime took place. Figure 1 presents
an analysis of the impact of crime on citywide beat-meeting attendance, beginning in 1995. 36 A multiple-regression analysis predicted monthly beat-meeting attendance from the level of two
types of crime, those occurring in public places (street crime) and
crimes in and around people’s homes (residential crime). They
both varied with the weather, a factor that affects almost every
aspect of crime and much of policing in the city. After a start-up
period, attendance and crime rose and fell in harmony—until the
years following 2010. Then, as the Figure indicates (see the
shaded areas), attendance fell by more than it “should have” as
predicted by crime. The shaded areas following 2010 flag the gap
between attendance predicted by crime and actual turnout, which
was lower than predicted. Other factors were coming into play

36 Beat-meeting data were keyed by the research team each month from individual
meeting reports filed by attending officers and approved by their sergeant. The data included details regarding citizen participation, the badge numbers and jobs of the officers
attending, and summaries of old and new issues discussed at the meeting. Figure 1 is
based on attendance data for 55,300 meetings taking place through the end of 2016.
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that affected the city’s community-policing effort. One of those
other factors was resources.
B. The Great Recession Hit the Budget Hard
Community policing—done right—can be expensive. It involves spending a great deal of time in face-to-face contact and
relationship building with the public. Officers must be trained—
and retrained—in how to do this. Figure 1 depicts attendance
trends at 55,300 community meetings, all of which had to be
planned, supplied with meeting materials, led by an officer
trained for the job, and, frequently, attended by other officers who
worked in the area. Beat meetings were only one aspect of the
project. Officers protected “positive loitering” groups that challenged loitering toughs, and they helped organize parent groups
that marched younger students safely to and from school. 37 Importantly, officers were assigned to patrol cars that were permanently assigned on two shifts a day to each of the city’s 269 police
beats. The beat officers needed to be spared time away from their
radio in order to work with the public. Other officers assigned to
rapid-response cars needed to be on duty to pick up the slack.
CAPS was one victim of budget cutbacks that inevitably hit the
police department. 38
The Great Recession was the greatest economic downturn in
the United States since the 1930s. The decimation of government
revenues it engendered did not begin to bite into city finances
right away, but the warning signs were on the horizon. Chicago’s
budget numbers were already shaky before it began. 39 In 2008, to
provide an emergency plug for the city’s draining coffers, Mayor
Richard M. Daley’s administration leased its parking-meter revenue for seventy-five years in return for $1.16 billion, which it
spent right away. 40 By 2009, sales-tax and real-estate transfer
revenues had begun to drop, and the assessed values underlying
property taxes stagnated. 41 Unemployment among city residents
was high. 42 The parking-meter deal provided only a temporary
budget fix, so—among many other things—the mayor began
SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 196–204.
See Rhee et al., supra note 7.
39 Rebecca Hendrick, Martin Luby & Jill Mason Terzakis, The Great Recession’s Impact on the City of Chicago 3 (Great Cities Inst., Working Paper No. GCP-10-7, 2010),
https://perma.cc/EZ85-N4ME.
40 Andrew Stern, Chicago Leases Parking Meters for $1.16 Billion, REUTERS (Dec. 2,
2008), https://perma.cc/YV9W-WL6P.
41 Hendrick et al., supra note 39, at 16.
42 Id. at 13.
37
38
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scaling back on policing. 43 His police department consumed about
38% of the city’s corporate budget, and by 2010 Daley faced a
$650 million deficit that he could not fix with smaller efficiencies. 44
In 1999, the CAPS budget (which did not include police salaries)
stood at $12.5 million, or 1.4% of the police department’s total.45
In response to the downturn, the mayor, in 2010, slashed the
CAPS budget from a still-healthy $9 million annually to about
$4.8 million. 46 About two hundred officers were reassigned from
CAPS to other duties. 47 At one time, off-duty beat officers were
paid overtime to attend meetings. 48 This was to introduce them to
people they would not ordinarily meet at early evening meetings
and to hear what residents’ concerns were. Late in the night they
would often hear other messages. 49 After 2008, only already-onduty officers could attend, and meetings could last only one hour.
To save money, the department also ceased hiring new officers. 50
When a new mayor (the first in twenty years) came into office
in mid-2011, he found that the force had shrunk by almost 1,400
officers, although definitions varied as to what the baseline level
actually was. 51 Mayor Rahm Emanuel could not afford to take on
even half of the 1,000 replacement officers that he had promised
during his election campaign, so he reverted to the time-honored
strategy of putting desk officers back on the street. Among them
were staff still assigned to district and headquarters communitypolicing offices. In January 2012, the police superintendent publicly announced a plan to reorganize CAPS, making district commanders more responsible for its operation. 52 However, few officers
and civilian organizers actually remained to do the work. The
mayor described this as decentralization, labeling it as a way to
“revitalize the program.” 53 I sat with district commanders in the
meeting at which this move was announced internally on

See Rhee et al., supra note 7.
See Dan Mihalopoulos & Mick Dumke, Next Mayor Will Face Tough Decisions to
Solve Financial Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2010), https://perma.cc/6DYS-2RUA.
45 See Rhee et al., supra note 7.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 A report on budget and resource cutbacks can be found in id.
49 See id.
50 Rhee et al., supra note 7.
51 See Hal Dardick & John Byrne, Emanuel Police Cuts Push Draws Criticism, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 31, 2011), https://perma.cc/JQP8-MF74.
52 See OFF. OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF CHI., Mayor Emanuel, Superintendent McCarthy
Announce Revitalization of Community Policing Program (Jan. 8, 2012),
https://perma.cc/QL5P-MAHS.
53 See Rhee et al., supra note 7.
43
44
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November 30, 2011, and they clearly saw it as making the reduction in CAPS’s resources their problem. In 2016, Emanuel cut the
CAPS budget again, down to $3.9 million—or 0.3% of the police
department total. 54
Earlier, district CAPS offices had two sergeants and five or
more officers on staff. 55 They organized and attended beat meetings, marches, and rallies, and they led special projects such as
scouting Explorer posts and athletic teams. They created and distributed newsletters and responded to numerous informational
phone calls concerning neighborhood problems. When community
groups needed a speaker, the CAPS office responded. This level of
staffing let the office operate on two shifts most days of the
week. 56 Following the cuts in late 2011, each district CAPS office
was allocated only one sergeant and two officers, which meant it
was closed much of the time. 57 As they were quick to point out,
they did not experience a commensurate reduction in their responsibilities. CAPS teams were still in charge of taking public reports and complaints, organizing events, and staffing the work
of District Advisory Committees and subcommittees. 58 Not surprisingly, fewer of these things were being done.
Earlier, the city also employed a staff of civilian street workers responsible for sustaining community involvement in CAPS.59
The CAPS Implementation Office worked closely with officers in
the districts. Most of its staff (which totaled almost ninety at its
height) were experienced community organizers. 60 The organizers
promoted upcoming beat meetings, and they trained and organized volunteer activities in their districts. Most spent a great
deal of time going door to door recruiting neighbors for block
clubs. 61 Daley participated in a CAPS rally every Saturday
morning, and organizers in the participating district put special
effort into turnout for that event. Between 1995 and the early
2000s, the office was responsible for marketing the program.62
They created flyers, t-shirts, bumper stickers, hats, pens, and
other familiar brand-development items. They also trained and
directed the work of subcommittees of the District Advisory
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

See id.
See SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 89–92.
ON THE BEAT, supra note 4, at 75–76.
See Rhee et al., supra note 7.
See ON THE BEAT, supra note 4, at 75–76.
See id. at 72–74.
SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 57.
See ON THE BEAT, supra note 4, at 72–74.
See id.
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Committees, especially their Court Advocacy and senior-citizen
support groups. City service coordinators organized intensive
“service blitzes” in run-down areas. 63 After the cutbacks, most districts had just one civilian community organizer, and a few had
none. 64 Early in the Emanuel administration, the Implementation
Office was folded completely.
An early victim of officer-staffing cutbacks was regular local
beat meetings. After the 2010 staffing cut, in contrast to earlier
periods, there were fewer meetings, fewer police attended when
they were held, and efforts to organize effective community action
through the meetings dissipated. 65 Regular monthly beat meetings largely disappeared. During 2015, only 13% of beats met at
least ten times per year, the past standard; more (20%) met only
quarterly; and two-thirds of beats met six times per year or less.66
In addition, following 2010, most districts combined their beats
into groups of two or three that met jointly, to reduce the total
number of meetings. In a few districts that still held smaller,
more frequent meetings, often just one officer would attend. In
about half of the districts that we followed, officers working daily
in the beat stopped attending meetings altogether; only a staffer
from the district office was there. In 2010, there were 2,800
monthly beat meetings throughout the city; by 2012, that number
had dropped to 1,480 meetings, and it went down in each succeeding year. Between 2010 and 2012 alone, total attendance dropped
by 50%, in concert with this decline in opportunities to participate.
“Everybody practices community policing,” Emanuel claimed during his successful campaign for reelection. 67 At the end of the year,
it was announced in the districts that there would be many fewer
beat meetings the following year, and the new rules included that
there could be no discussion of individual crime incidents nor
complaints about police manpower. 68

SKOGAN & STEINER, supra note 32, at 87.
See Rhee et al., supra note 7.
65 See id. (“[W]hen funding for community policing started decreasing . . . [t]he number of public meetings between officers and community members decreased.”).
66 These findings come from my calculations based on CPD data.
67 Dumke, supra note 6.
68 On Anniversary of Our Founding, Alderman Walks Out of Police Meeting,
CWBCHICAGO (Nov. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/CNU3-PG89.
63
64
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FIGURE 2: TRENDS IN CAPS AWARENESS AND INVOLVEMENT

Declining CAPS involvement could also be seen in surveys of
city residents. Figure 2 compares the results of a 2003 city survey
with the findings of the 2015 study described earlier. 69 On the left,
it depicts the level of sheer awareness of the city’s effort. Recognition of CAPS or community policing (both terms were in the
question) was very high in the early 2000s, driven in part by the
city’s aggressive CAPS marketing campaign. Awareness later
dropped only a bit. In 2003, almost 90% of African Americans
knew about CAPS, and that number dropped only to 87% in 2015.
A notable drop in recognition between 2003 and 2015 was among
Hispanics, a group that Chicago always struggled to get involved.
Their awareness of CAPS dropped from 73% to 56%. Most of this
decline was among Spanish speakers rather than Hispanics who
we interviewed in English.
More notable was a decrease in reports that beat meetings
were being held, which they often were not. Interviewers briefly
described the meetings, then asked if respondents had heard
about beat meetings being held in their neighborhood in the past
twelve months. Awareness that meetings were taking place had
dropped by two-thirds among African Americans (down to 23%)
and almost as substantially among others. Among Latinos, reports that meetings were taking place stood at only 11% in 2015.
69 The 2003 survey is described in SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 104. The 2015 survey is
described in Wesley G. Skogan, Stop and Frisk and Trust in Police in Chicago, in POLICECITIZEN RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF SOURCES AND IMPEDIMENTS OF
LEGITIMACY AROUND THE WORLD 247, 249–51 (Dietrich Oberwittler & Sebastian Roché
eds., 2017).
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Finally, survey reports of actual participation (the rightmost bars
in Figure 3) paralleled the decline in attendance documented by
the city’s headcounts, dropping by a factor of four. Chicagoans
noticed this drop in opportunities to participate in community
safety.
IV. POLICING AND THE POLICE CHANGED
A. Leadership Turnover
An enduring feature of police departments is that their policies
and priorities are very tied to the views and commitments of the
chief—also known as the superintendent. In Chicago, the superintendent serves at the pleasure of the mayor, and both feel the
heat regarding crime and policing policies. At its inception, CAPS
was nurtured by two successive chiefs of police who were committed to its success. 70 This was no accident; both had been selected
for the job by a mayor who had insisted on its adoption in the first
place. The real origin of community policing in Chicago was in
Daley’s office. He learned about it through his network of big city
mayors, and he hired a consulting team that studied the police
department’s staffing and came up with an organizational plan. 71
The consultants as well as Daley played a role in the selection of
Matt Rodriguez as the Superintendent of Police who would oversee the implementation of community policing. 72 His successor,
Terry Hillard, proved just as supportive, and between them, they
led the department for eleven years. 73
Then leadership from city hall faltered. When the position fell
vacant in late 2003, the mayor chose a new superintendent from
the detective bureau. 74 Philip Cline was chosen, rather than a
more community-oriented candidate, despite the fact that the
city’s murder count in 2003 was the lowest in twelve years. 75 Cline
refocused the department on guns, gangs, and homicides. 76 The
city’s modern stop-and-frisk regime was born during his tenure.
Policing initiatives that had been center stage before, including
community policing, were starved of resources to support this new
policy direction.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 1, at 38–39.
See id.
For more detail regarding the selection process, see id.
See id.
See Dumke, supra note 6.
SKOGAN & STEINER, supra note 32, at 74.
See Dumke, supra note 6.
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As is often the case with Chicago public officials, Cline’s tenure
ended in scandal. 77 The mayor again chose a chief of police who
was uninvested in community policing. He would not appoint any
of the candidates that the city’s police board put forward to him,
which was required by law, and during the ten-month hiatus in
leadership that followed, no one knew what direction the department would turn next. Eventually, Daley took the unpopular step
of going outside the CPD for his next chief of police. He found Jody
Weis, who was the special agent in charge in the Philadelphia office
of the FBI. 78 He was the first outsider appointed police superintendent in more than fifty years. Weis was not opposed to community policing, but it lay completely outside of his line of experience. His brief tenure in office (three years) was marred by
dissension within the leadership ranks and disputes with the
police union, which sensed that he had never found his political
footing. 79 One of their points of contention was Weis’s right to
wear a Chicago police uniform. He and Daley left office at about
the same moment. 80
Emanuel chose to make crime a central issue—as new U.S.
mayors often do—during his 2011 campaign to replace Daley.81
He promised to put one thousand more officers on the street and
to pick a new police chief who would make effective use of them.
He ran against the muddled leadership of Weis and the financial
mess that proved real when he took over city hall. 82 His choice of
a new chief also came from out of town. Garry McCarthy had spent
most of his career with the New York City Police Department.83
There, he was the deputy commissioner for operations and the
director of the department’s metrics-driven CompStat management process. McCarthy had first interviewed for the Chicago job
in 2003, when Cline was selected, and was among the three finalists for the position. He was a supporter of the “broken windows”

77 Andrew Fan, Many Superintendents Have Tried to Reform the Chicago Police, CITY
BUREAU (Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/RLX4-J3CU.
78 James O’Shea, Despite Progress, Police Chief Still Struggles, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17,
2010), https://perma.cc/FFU7-N7TS.
79 See id.
80 See Fan, supra note 77.
81 Mick Dumke, Did Rahm Live Up to His Campaign Promises on Public Safety?,
CHI. READER (Jan. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/646T-LZJJ.
82 Dumke, supra note 6.
83 Kristen Mack, Rahm Emanuel Is Set to Name Garry McCarthy New Chicago
Police Superintendent Monday, Source Says, CHI. TRIB. (May 1, 2011),
https://perma.cc/KHV4-R2LS.
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policing strategy 84 promoted by his commissioner at the time,
William Bratton. 85 McCarthy and Bratton’s approach was to
crack down relentlessly on minor offenses—such as curfew violations, public drinking, vandalism, pot smoking, and graffiti writing—to send a robust deterrent message to the community that
lawbreaking was unacceptable. When it came to guns and drugs,
their favored tool was stop and frisk. Stop and frisk reached a
crescendo during McCarthy’s tenure; in 2014, Chicago police
made more than 718,000 stops. 86
B. Problem-Solving Moved Elsewhere
During its first fifteen years, police representation at the
CAPS meetings was strong; an average of five officers attended
each meeting. Most were from the district CAPS office or were
members of the beat teams that answered calls in the area. For
CAPS’s first decade, off-duty beat officers were paid to attend so
that problems taking place on their shifts were also discussed.
The official line was that Chicago police were committed to
“problem-solving policing,” and they all had been trained in doing
it. 87 The department’s official problem-solving model framed the
discussion of local conditions at many meetings.
Importantly, CAPS accepted a broad definition of its mandate
to respond to community concerns, and many vexing noncrime
problems gained priority status. 88 Better listening to the community produced different policing agendas. Officers involved in
neighborhood policing quickly learned that many residents are
deeply concerned about problems that previously did not come to
police attention. 89 Early in its life, CAPS’s beat meetings were
closely linked to city services. Complaints recorded at beat meetings were quickly translated into service-delivery requests. 90 A
statistical analysis documented that these services were distributed in response to need and to the priorities of beat-meeting
attendees. 91 Civilian service coordinators also organized service
blitzes (known variously as “wolf packs” and “super-block

84 Rachael Levy & Jennifer Delgado, McCarthy Touts “Broken Windows” CrimeFighting Strategy, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/EBA2-XKQF.
85 See id.
86 Data on file with author.
87 See SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 70–76.
88 See ON THE BEAT, supra note 4, at 77–80.
89 See id. at 79.
90 See SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 206–07.
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cleanups”) in strategic locations, as a follow-up to police crackdowns. 92 The districts also had troubled-buildings officers who
prioritized targets for a citywide Strategic Inspections Task Force
and the city attorney’s troubled-buildings prosecution team. 93
Over time, city residents saw their neighborhoods become cleaner
and more orderly. Over ten years of surveys, concern about graffiti
dropped by half, and most respondents saw declines in disruption
around schools, fewer problems stemming from abandoned buildings, and less junk and trash strewn around. 94 There was a notable increase in the percentage of African Americans and Latinos
who thought that police were being responsive to neighborhood
concerns. 95
But over time, responsibility for much of this shifted from the
shoulders of the police, and into the arms of the city’s 311 city
service hotline. Beginning in the 2000s, there were a series of
technical improvements to its behind-the-scenes operations. 96 Upto-date computer technology was acquired to process complaints,
allocate them to the right agencies, and reach into the agencies’
databases to follow up on complaints that had been sent their
way. 97 During 2012, the first year for which the data on 311 operations can be found in the Chicago Data Portal, the hotline handled 34,300 complaints concerning rats, more than 20,000 reports
of abandoned cars, and 132,100 graffiti complaints. 98 The system
became widely known and popular, and aldermen later rebelled
when Emanuel proposed to sell the 311 system to a private vendor
to raise cash. 99
This was all well and good for the city, but it erased yet another incentive for residents to turn out for beat meetings and
work with their district CAPS officers on neighborhood problems.
In the past, if residents had an issue, they went to a meeting,
filled out a problem form, and handed it to an officer who would
fax it downtown later that evening. 100 The meetings featured
lively discussions of a broad range of neighborhood problems.
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Parking and traffic issues came up as often as personal crime and
gangs. 101 Abandoned buildings, bad landlords, and loose garbage
in the alleys were often on the agenda. 102 When we revisited beat
meetings in 2013, it was apparent that the meetings had taken a
narrower focus. When residents shared problems, they were told
to just keep calling 311 or their alderman. CAPS no longer offered
a fast-tracked response to their issues. Officers threw up their
hands when residents complained about slow responses to service
requests. The districts no longer seemed to work in coordination
with the beat meetings, and a common response by officers to
complaints about crime at the meetings was to keep calling 911.
C. A Dubious Rank and File?
Under many circumstances, planned organizational reforms
can be sidetracked by a lack of support from employees on the
operations side. A study of the sustainability of reform in community corrections agencies concluded that line workers had to understand how reform could be accommodated in their daily operations (and sometimes it could not), and they had to think that it
was legitimate and worth their time. 103
Officer support for community policing in Chicago was mixed.
CAPS was always more popular with the public than it was internally. 104 Many officers initially dismissed it as “just politics” or
another passing civilian fad. 105 They were certainly unfamiliar
with it; community policing came late to Chicago. Reformers were
asking them to do new things, and old things in new ways, which
was challenging. Officers expected CAPS to wither on the vine,
like other well-sounding initiatives. A 1995 department-wide survey of officer opinion found that many were dubious about the
impact of the program on crime and the police’s relationship with
the community. Mostly, they believed that CAPS would just bring
more work their way. 106 But at that time, they had no experience
with the project; they barely knew what it was.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 129.
103 See generally Danielle S. Rudes, Shannon Portillo & Faye S. Taxman, The Legitimacy of Change: Adopting/Adapting, Implementing and Sustaining Reforms Within Community Corrections Agencies, 61 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2021).
104 Compare TAKING STOCK, supra note 4, at 17 (finding that community trust in police
increased following CAPS implementation in 1993), with Arthur J. Lurigio & Wesley G.
Skogan, Winning the Hearts and Minds of Police Officers: An Assessment of Staff Perceptions of Community Policing in Chicago, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 315, 329 (1994).
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A 2013 survey of district officers included questions reevaluating the depth of support for CAPS among the rank and file. In
total, 714 police officers and sergeants were interviewed after being selected at random from the duty rosters of the 22 police districts. 107 The results suggested that there was majority, albeit
tepid, support for CAPS. The responses to three such questions
about CAPS are summarized in Figure 3.
In the survey, respondents were asked how much they agreed
with CAPS “as a model for Chicago policing today.” They were
also asked, “If you could choose, how likely is it that you would
participate in community policing activities in your district?” This
is not an entirely hypothetical question, as officers often find ways
to evade assignments that they would like to avoid. Finally, they
were asked, “How important is community policing to the effectiveness of the department?” In total, 65% agreed at least
“slightly” with the CAPS model. About 40% of officers fell in more
supportive categories, agreeing with the concept at least “somewhat,” as illustrated in Figure 3. Fewer officers in total (56%)
thought that they would be likely to volunteer, but 40% were
again fairly supportive. Many more, 70%, agreed to some extent
with the view that community policing was important to the department. I would judge the support for CAPS suggested by these
figures as “not terrible.”
FIGURE 3: OFFICER SUPPORT FOR CAPS

In 2013, African American officers were more supportive of
community policing, as were women and officers who joined the
107 For more on the survey, see Wesley G. Skogan, Surveying Police Officers, in
ENVISIONING CRIMINOLOGY: RESEARCHERS ON RESEARCH AS A PROCESS OF DISCOVERY 109,
109–15 (Michael D. Maltz & Stephen K. Rice eds., 2015).
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force at an older age. Officers who scored high on measures of
their support for the procedural-justice principles being taught at
the training academy were very strongly supportive of CAPS,
both as a model for policing and in terms of their own participation. 108 The most important source of opposition to CAPS was police culture. This was measured in the survey by responses to
questions regarding how isolated offices felt from the community,
the strength of in-group solidarity, and their levels of cynicism
regarding political leaders, the press, and top leaders of their own
organization. Officers who were high on these dimensions were
very opposed to the CAPS initiative—and they were opposed to just
about everything else that was going on in the department as well.
I observed, importantly, that CAPS avoided being at crosspurposes with the city’s largest police union, the Fraternal Order
of Police (FOP). From the beginning, the initiative was planned
to fit within the terms of the labor agreement. For example, I
noted that officers retained their rights when it came to bidding
for shifts and assignments and received generous overtime pay if
they elected to attend events outside of their regular shift. There
was an early rumor that they would be reporting to civilian activists rather than their sergeants, but this turned out not to be the
case. Some prominent members of the union governing board became involved in planning aspects of the program. More truculent
conflicts with the FOP that spill beyond bread-and-butter issues
and into political and cultural domains were to come later, nearer
to the end of the 2010s. 109
However, an important feature of policing is that officers do
their job. Beat meetings were held even if attendance was low because they were an organizational strategy. They were held
monthly at neighborhood venues that were secured by the CAPS
offices, including churches, schools, hospital cafeterias, apartmentbuilding party rooms, and park-district buildings. The beatteam sergeant often had keys to the building. When officers were
assigned to attend meetings, they showed up, bringing along
materials that had been prepared at the office for distribution. If
their sergeant wanted them to sit among audience members rather
than cluster in a back corner, they moved. One officer was always
assigned to co-lead the meeting along with a local CAPS activist,
and many did a decent job of it. They had occasional training on
how to run a beat meeting. When discussion would turn to what
108 See Wesley G. Skogan, Maarten Van Craen & Cari Hennessy, Training Police in
Procedural Justice, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 319, 323 (2015).
109 SKOGAN, supra note 2, at 94–95.
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police had been doing regarding crime problems discussed at
earlier meetings, they usually had something to report. Their
sergeant would approve and sign a beat meeting report noting
attendance, the names and employee numbers of officers who
were present, and the old and new problems that were discussed.
The numbers would be collected and reviewed at police headquarters, where reports were generated tracking attendance and
the frequency of meetings. Having been involved in many activities organized and run by well-meaning but busy volunteers with
jobs and families to attend to, I can attest that there are many
advantages to involving the community through the organized
structure provided by CAPS.
D. CAPS Lost Its Place at the Table
A sign of CAPS’s near demise was when it lost its place in the
city’s organization chart. Into the 2000s, its daily operations were
on the mayor’s mind, and CAPS literally had a place at the table. 110
There were monthly CAPS status meetings in the mayor’s office.
The meetings were attended by senior police leaders, the head of
the civilian CAPS Implementation Office, the coordinator of city
services, the director of the city’s troubled-buildings program, and
other officials who were contributing to the effort. 111 I sometimes
attended as well. The mayor was skilled at managing bureaucracies, and he did not shrink from issuing direct orders. But in
the early 2000s these sessions ended, and by 2010, all the senior
civilian leaders save one were gone, along with the Implementation Office itself. The remaining staffer, who had been sent to
CAPS at its origin by the mayor to watch over it on his behalf,
was sent to work two levels down in the Patrol Division office at
police headquarters. The sworn leaders of the division oversaw
the work of about nine thousand people and did not often focus on
CAPS. There was a new mayor in office, and community policing
had slipped off city hall’s agenda, seemingly for good.
V. THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNITY POLICING
I judge the Great Recession to be the most consequential factor
involved in the collapse of community policing in Chicago. Policing
was the largest item on the city’s general budget, and civic leaders
had to find a lot of money quickly. CAPS was still popular with
the voters, but tax increases were not. Over 90% of the
110
111
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department’s money went to salaries, so budget cuts meant staffing cuts. Outrage over the parking-meter deal closed a path to
selling off other city assets, which was already underway. Every
city agency felt the financial pain, not just the police. The mayor
squeezed both CAPS and department staffing generally to conserve cash. His decision to leave 1,400 police positions unfilled
was not taken lightly. 112 The recession also arrived at an important moment in the early 2000s when community policing was
no longer a priority at police headquarters. The mayor’s efforts
were directed elsewhere, and by 2010, it was apparent that he
was tired and ready to step down. This, I think, was the second
arrow in the side of community policing. Ensuing events cut further into support for CAPS. Crime and the use of crime data to
drive aggressive policing strategies reemerged on the city’s
agenda, beginning fifteen years after the launch of CAPS when
violent crime stopped dropping. There was a new mayor who had
no experience in municipal administration, much less policing. He
had campaigned against crime and weak police leadership, and
he was politically committed to somehow putting more officers on
the street and encouraging his new police chief’s aggressive stopand-frisk agenda. It did not help that community policing does
not lend itself to instant and quantifiable results or even activity
counts, and it never really found a place in the department’s
CompStat management system. 113 The decline in crime and the
shift in many neighborhood problem-solving efforts elsewhere in
city government appears to have weakened residents’ resolve to
turn out in the evening for meetings, and after 2010, few officers
were there to hear their concerns. When the city faced another
legitimacy crisis at the end of 2015, there was not much left of
CAPS to turn to.
Now, U.S. policing faces another legitimacy crisis of major
proportions. Communities around the nation are seeking new
opportunities to build and sustain public confidence in the police.
In its 2015 report, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing included community policing as one of its six “pillars of
reform.” 114 It noted the importance of community policing “as a
guiding philosophy for all stakeholders” and recommended that
agencies co-produce public safety by “work[ing] with community
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residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing
solutions that produce meaningful results for the community.”115
Community policing was one of the task force’s most important
solutions to the legitimacy crisis.
In Chicago, community policing collapsed, but it did not die.
The origins of CAPS lay in widespread dissatisfaction with the
quality of service being delivered by Chicago police during the late
1980s. 116 In Chicago, as around the country, community policing
was aimed at building trust in the community and ensuring support for the police among voters and taxpayers. Now its time may
have come again. In 2016, there was a historic and persistent
spike in Chicago’s gun violence. 117 This coincided with an enormous scandal involving the cover-up of a young man killed by the
police in November 2015. 118 In response, in January 2016, the
deputy mayor for public safety recruited members for a new Community Policing Advisory Panel charged with overseeing the revitalization of community policing in the city. Before the panel
convened, she left the administration, and there was another new
chief of police. However, both the panel and promises regarding
the reestablishment of a community-policing initiative are enshrined in the federal consent decree on police reform that resulted from the scandal. 119 The first forty substantive subsections
of the agreement concern community policing. Following a list of
guiding principles, the decree specifies actions to be taken on
seven distinct aspects of community policing. 120 Organizationally,
direction of the program was rescued from the depths of the Patrol
Division and moved into the Office of the Superintendent. New
staff members were hired and trained, and management systems
were put in place to direct the program and produce regular reports for the consent-decree monitor. The soon-arriving post–
COVID-19 period will be the test of the ability of the organization
to reinvent itself again.
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